Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Karl W. Winsness : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Solomon J. Chacon; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Winsness, No. 920157.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4107

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

•'*&% i * w w ^ ^

-w*

mm

v™ir w mgwvimw

MkMT
i\

5t
^10

IN THE SUPREME COg]T OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 880171
Priority No. 2

KARL W. WINSNESS,
Defendant/Appellant.

9P-0157-D

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 64-101 (1990) AND UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-202
(1990) (AMENDED 1991), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO,
PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

SOLOMON J. CHACON
Attorney at Law
124 South 400 East, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

F

I 1 rMl 2 4 1992

CLERK SUPREME COUR'
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 880171
Priority No. 2

v.
KARL W. WINSNESS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 764-101 (1990) AND UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-202
(1990) (AMENDED 1991), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO,
PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

SOLOMON J. CHACON
Attorney at Law
124 South 400 East, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE "MARSHALLING" REQUIREMENT, HIS CLAIM THAT
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION

7

DEFENDANT'S USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION

11

A.

Defense of Habitation

12

B.

Jury Instructions

17

CONCLUSION

20

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991)

8, 9

Heinecke v. Department of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459 (Utah
App. 1991)

9

State In re R.J.Z.. 736 P.2d 235 (Utah 1987)

. . 13-16

State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985)

8

State v. Buel. 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 1985)

17

State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988)

17

State v. Castonauav, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983)

11

State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502 (Utah 1986)

9, 17

State v. Duran. 772 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1989)

13

State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991)

13, 15

State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)

2, 8

State v. Gleason. 17 Utah 2d 150, 405 P.2d 793 (Utah 1965)
State v. Henderson. 114 Wash.2d 867, 792 P.2d 514 (1990)

. 18
. . 18

State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989)

17

State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980)

8

State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)

15

State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

12

State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980)

8, 11, 17

State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982)

9

State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987)

. . . . 2, 17, 18, 20

State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990)

8

State v. Moritzskv. 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989)
ii

13

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989)

18

State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991) . . 2, 8, 18, 20
State v. Scheel, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah App. Dec.
3, 1991)
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)

8, 9
8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) (amended 1991)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1990)

12-15, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1991)
Utah R. Crim. P. 19

1
2, 17, 18

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880171

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

v.
KARL W. WINSNESS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant, Karl W. Winsness, was convicted for
attempted first degree murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990)1 and Utah Code
Ann. 76-5-202 (1990) (amended 1991).2

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to

support defendant's conviction?

In reviewing a jury verdict,

this Court views the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the verdict and will only
1

Although the attempt statute, section 76-4-101, was not
expressly charged in the information, it is clear from the
information, as well as the record on appeal that defendant was
prosecuted and subsequently convicted for attempted first degree
murder (Record [hereinafter R.] 41).
2

Section 76-5-202 has been amended since its application
in this case, but the minor substantive and stylistic changes
made have no material effect on the issues raised here.

interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that
a reasonable jury could not possibly have reached the verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Utah 1989), cert, denied,
2.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285
U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990).

Is defendant precluded from challenging the jury

instructions given?

It is well established that "'[n]o party may

assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his
objection. "•

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021-23 (Utah 1987)

(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)).

Moreover, where an instruction

is submitted by a party, that same party cannot later object to
it because he has already waived any objection and endorsed it as
legally sound.

State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App.

1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Karl W. Winsness, was charged with
attempted first degree murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202 (1990) (amended 1991)

(R. 41). Following a jury

trial held April 12-14, 1988, defendant was convicted as charged
(R. 46-50, 136). The trial court subsequently sentenced

2

defendant to a term of five years which may be for life at the
Utah State Prison (R. 140).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of January 1, 1988, several officers
from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office attempted to execute a
no-knock search warrant for defendant's residence, located at 448
North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah (Transcript of jury trial,
April 12-14, 1988 [hereinafter T.] 66-72).

Prior to execution of

the no-knock warrant, at approximately 8:25 p.m., Officer Leslie
Ann Taylor made an anonymous phone call to defendant's residence
in an attempt to determine whether or not defendant was at home
(T. 61). Officer Taylor asked the male individual who answered
the phone at defendant's residence if he was "Willie," to which
defendant replied, "Yeah[,] what do you want" (T. 61-62).
Officer Taylor then responded, "I'll be there in a minute," and
hung up the phone (T. 61-62).
Shortly after receiving confirmation from Officer
Taylor that defendant was on the premises, five deputy sheriffs
and two probation and parole agents attempted to execute the
warrant (T. 71-72).

Officers Steve Alexander, Jerry Rigby, Keith

Stevens, Kevin Judd and Keith Rogers positioned themselves on and
around defendant's front porch, while Agents Gerald White and
Gary Bortolussi proceeded to the back of the residence (T. 66-77,
92-96, 112-15, 125-27, 147, 156-57, 196-99).

Yelling "Sheriff's

Office," Officer Alexander pulled the screen to the front door
open, allowing Officer Rigby to kick it in (T. 72, 84, 95, 121).

3

As Officer Rigby kicked the front door, all five officers began
yelling "Sheriff's Office" in order to alert those inside to
their presence (T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104, 115, 121,
127, 131, 197). The door opened approximately six to twelve
inches and immediately slammed shut again, forcing Officer Rigby
to attempt a second kick which opened the door approximately six
to fourteen inches (T. 72, 95, 116). Yelling "Sheriff's Office,"
Officer Stevens attempted to force the door open further, holding
his weapon in his right hand (T. 73, 115-16).

Immediately as he

hit the door, Officer Stevens heard several gunshots, lasting
approximately 1 to 1 and 1/2 seconds, and felt debris hitting his
face (T. 115-117).

Before ducking back out of the doorway,

Officer Stevens observed defendant crouched down inside the
residence, illuminated by flashes from the weapon he was firing
(T. 118). The officers immediately sought cover and none of the
officers returned fire (T. 77).
From the time the officers first attempted entry to the
cessation of defendant's gunfire, approximately three to five
seconds passed (T. 75, 104, 109). In total, defendant fired
approximately four or five shots in the general direction of the
front door, one of which seriously wounded Officer Rogers (who
had stepped up onto the porch following Officer Rigby's first
kick) in his left arm and chest area (T. 75, 86, 96, 121, 127128, 196-98, 203). Two bullet holes were discovered on and
around the front door jamb at heights of approximately five feet,
eleven inches and six feet, and were estimated to have been fired
4

from a distance of approximately 20 feet (T. 136-38, 141-44).
Apparently the bullet striking the door jamb proceeded up through
the porch awning at a height of approximately eight feet (T. 139141).

At the time police seized the .357 magnum from defendant's

living room, it contained five rounds of live ammunition (T. 17273).
Shortly after the shooting, Agent Bortolussi heard
movement from inside the rear of the house and called out, "Karl,
is that you," to which defendant replied, "Yes" (T. 158). Agent
Bortolussi identified himself and asked if defendant remembered
him (T. 158). In reply, defendant asked what was "going on out
there," and indicated that he did not want to be shot and that he
wanted to call his father (T. 158). Agent Bortolussi assured
defendant that he would not be shot and instructed him to give
himself up (T. 161). Defendant subsequently surrendered to
police, approximately 20 minutes later (T. 163). While being
transported to jail, defendant asked if a "cop" had been shot,
and stated that he had been "scared" and "didn't know what to do"
(T. 184). He further stated that he had called his father
because "[he] didn't want to get shot [him]self" (T. 184). At
the county jail defendant inquired as to the safety of his house
and said he was sorry that the "cop" had been shot.
had to do something to protect me.

He said, "I

It was self defense.

Someone

was kicking in your door, wouldn't you do it[?]" (T. 192).
Defendant also asked about bail requirements and when he was

5

informed that there would be no bail he stated, "[T]hat's not
fair[,] I only shot in self defense" (T. 192).
Other facts will be presented in the body of this
brief, as pertinent to specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Points I and II of his brief on appeal defendant
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that when he fired at law enforcement officers who were
attempting to execute a no-knock search warrant for his residence
he intended to kill them, and (2) that his conduct was not
justified as defense of habitation.

In so arguing, defendant

merely recounts a version of the facts most favorable to him, and
has not complied with the "marshalling" requirement for
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Thus, while

emphasizing the evidence that supported his position at trial,
defendant has left it to this Court to determine what evidence
actually supported his conviction.

Therefore, this Court need

not and should not consider his allegations of insufficiency.
Alternatively, if the Court decides to address
defendant's sufficiency argument, a review of the record in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict reveals that defendant's
conviction is amply supported by the evidence.
As for defendant's allegations of error concerning the
jury instructions, which are raised for the first time on appeal
to this Court, he has failed to properly preserve those

6

allegations for review•

Moreover, the instructions of which

defendant complains were submitted by him to the trial court, and
defendant affirmatively represented to the court that he had no
objections to the instructions given.

Because the doctrine of

invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial
and then complaining of it on appeal, this Court should decline
to review defendant's arguments.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE "MARSHALLING" REQUIREMENT, HIS CLAIM THAT
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence
to support his jury conviction of attempted first degree murder
on the ground that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that when he fired at law enforcement officers who were
attempting to execute a no-knock search warrant for his residence
he intended to kill them (Br. of App. at 6).

Specifically,

defendant asserts that there is a "gap between the evidence that
[he] shot his gun and the conclusion that [he] intended to
unlawfully kill somebody" (Br. of App. at 7).

In support of his

assertion defendant merely reargues the evidence presented at
trial and thus fails to demonstrate that even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is
insufficient to support his conviction (Br. of App. at 9-14).

7

Appellat€5 courts accord great deference to the jury's
verdict.

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

So long

as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's
findings, this Court will not disturb them.
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).

State v. Booker, 709

Specifically, in reviewing a jury

verdict, this Court views the evidence and all inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and will
only interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable jury could not possibly have reached the
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d

273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
(1990); Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231.

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 1837

Furthermore, the defendant has

the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so inconclusive
or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime[.]"
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989).

See also

Included in that

burden is the obligation to "marshal all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and . . . then show how this marshaled evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Scheel, 175 Utah Adv.

Rep. 43, 44 (Utah App. Dec. 3, 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)).

See also Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); cf.
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) (applying

8

"marshalling" requirement to challenge to trial court's findings
of fact).
Although defendant discusses most of the evidence
adduced at trial, he fails to view that evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict and then demonstrate that so
viewed, the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's
verdict (Br, of App. at 8-13).

Rather, defendant's brief

recounts a version of the facts most favorable to him.

"Thus,

while 'emphasizing the evidence that supported his position,'
defendant has left it to [this Court] to sort out what evidence
actually supported the findings."

Scheel, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. at

44 (quoting Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah App. 1991)).

Because defendant has not demonstrated why

the evidence at trial is so inconclusive that a reasonable jury
could not have convicted him, this Court may properly decline to
entertain the merits of his argument on appeal. Id.; Moore, 802
P.2d at 738; Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800.
Alternatively, should this Court decide to reach the
merits of defendant's sufficiency argument, a review of the
record in the light most favorable to the jury verdict reveals
that defendant's conviction is amply supported by the evidence.
It is well established that intent is rarely capable of proof by
direct evidence.
1982).

State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah

Thus, "Utah law clearly permits the inference of such

intent from the actions of a defendant considered in light of
surrounding circumstances."

Id.; State v. Dumas. 721 P.2d 502,

9

504 (Utah 1986) ("Intent is an element that often can be proved
only by means of circumstantial evidence,").

Considering the

circumstances surrounding the instant case, there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably
infer defendant's intent to kill.

Specifically, the State

introduced evidence that the officers attempting to execute the
no-knock search warrant for defendant's residence that night
identified themselves by yelling either "Sheriff's Office," or
"Sheriff's Department," simultaneously with their efforts to kick
in defendant's front door (T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104,
115, 121, 127, 131, 197). Almost immediately the officers heard
several gunshots from inside defendant's residence (T. 115-117).
Officer Stevens felt debris hitting his face and observed
defendant crouched down inside the residence, illuminated by
flashes from the weapon he was firing (T. 115-118).

In total,

the officers heard defendant fire approximately four or five
shots in the general direction of the front door, one of which
seriously wounded Officer Rogers in his left arm and chest area
(T. 75, 86, 96, 121, 127-128, 196-98, 203). Officers
investigating the shooting subsequently found two bullet holes on
and around the front door jamb at heights of approximately five
feet, eleven inches and six feet, and estimated that the shots
had been fired from a distance of approximately 20 feet (T. 13638, 141-44).

Apparently, the bullet striking the door jamb

proceeded through to the exterior of the house and up through the
porch awning at a height of approximately eight feet (T. 13910

141).

At the time police seized defendant's .357 magnum from his

living room, it contained five rounds of live ammunition (T. 17273).
Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the
circumstantial evidence in this case invites, rather than
excludes, other reasonable hypotheses than guilt (Br. of App. at
11-12).
1983).

See State v. Castonquav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah
Specifically, defendant asserts that even assuming the

officers did identify themselves, he simply did not hear their
shouts of identification and that he merely fired warning shots
at the officers, thinking that they were attempting to rob him
(Br. of App. at 8-13; T. 222, 226, 231).
Contrary to defendant's apparent view, the evidence
relied upon by the jury need not refute contrary allegations made
by the defendant, so long as the jury verdict, as in this case,
is supported by substantial evidence.

Lamm, 606 P.2d at 232.

Defendant's jury obviously did not find his story credible, and
the attendant facts and circumstances adequately support that
conclusion.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION.
In Point II of his brief on appeal defendant again
attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that his
conduct was justified as defense of habitation (Br. of App. at
15-18).

Defendant further asserts that his requested defense of

habitation instruction "failed to clarify the confusing aspects"
11

of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1990) (setting forth the defense of
habitation), that the sequence in which the instructions were
read "[gave] the appearance" that the defense of habitation was
not available to him, and that the jury was never instructed "on
the respective burdens of proof" (Br. of App. at 19-21).

As a

result, defendant contends, he was denied "a fair trial under the
Due Process clause of the constitutions of Utah3 and the United
States because the jury did not have a clear guideline as to how
to interpret and apply the vague wording of section 76-2-405"
(Br. of App. at 21). As before, defendant's argument as to the
sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit, and his challenges to
the jury instructions given are not properly before this Court.
A.

Defense of Habitation.

Section 76-2-405* gives a person the right to use
3

Because defendant only nominally alludes to his state
constitutional rights and has provided no analysis based on state
constitutional provisions, the State's analysis is limited to
defendant's allegation of a federal constitutional violation.
Similarly, this Court should not engage in a separate state
constitutional analysis of defendant's claims. State v.
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988).
*

Section 76-2-405(1) provides in pertinent part:
A person is justified in using force against
another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent or terminate the other's
unlawful entry into or attack upon his
habitation; however, he is justified in the
use of force which is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a
violent emd tumultuous manner,
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he
reasonably believes that the entry is
12

reasonable force to "prevent" or "terminate" another's unlawful
entry or attack upon his "habitation."

State v. Gardiner, 814

P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991); State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690
(Utah App. 1989) (section 76-2-405 provides that defense of one's
habitation may justify the use of force); State v. Duran, 772
P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1989).

However, in order to justify the

use of force, or, as in this case, deadly force in defense of
habitation, a person must have a reasonable belief that the
degree of force used was necessary to prevent the intruders from
committing a violent act or felony.
235, 236 (Utah 1987).

State In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d

Where it is also established that an entry

was "'unlawful' and 'made or attempted by use of force, or in a
violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth,
or for the purpose of committing a felony,'" the person's use of
force will be presumed reasonable. .Id. (citing section 76-2405(2) ). 5

For purposes of the defense of habitation statute,
attempted or made for the purpose of
assaulting or offering personal violence to
any person, dwelling, or being in the
habitation and he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent the assault
or offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry
is made or attempted for the purpose of
committing a felony in the habitation and
that the force is necessary to prevent the
commission of the felony.

Section 76-2-405(2) provides:
The person using force or deadly force in
defense of habitation is presumed for the
13

this Court evaluates the reasonableness of a person's use of
force under an objective standard.

Id.

This Court has previously noted that "[t]he first step
in deciding whether any defendant is justified under section 762-405 is to determine what burden of proof the defendant and the
State are respectively required to carry."
236-37.

R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at

Because the trial court in R.J.Z. had refused to make a

finding as to whether the entry in that case was unlawful and
forcible, this Court found it impossible to allocate the burden
of proof and thus determine whether R.J.Z's use of force
qualified for a legal presumption of reasonableness pursuant to
subsection (2) of the statute.

Therefore, this Court remanded

R.J.Z. to allow the trial court to make those factual findings.
Id.
Contrary to R.J.Z., the trial court in this case
clearly instructed the jury that the officers attempted entry of
defendant's home was lawful in accordance with a valid search
warrant (R. 121; Jury Instruction #26). Thus, notwithstanding
the violent and tumultuous manner in which entry was attempted in
this case, the presumption of reasonableness in subsection (2)
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.

14

has no application here because the attempted entry of identified
police officers was lawful.

Cf.. Gardiner, 814 P. 2d at 576

(concluding that the legislature intended section 76-2-405 to
exclude from its operation peace officers acting in the course of
their duties).
Where, as here, the defendant's use of deadly force is
not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, in order to
avail himself of the defense of habitation the defendant must
show that he was defending his habitation from a violent,
tumultuous, surreptitious, or stealthy entry; that he reasonably
believed that the entry was to do violence or commit a felony;
and that he reasonably believed that his use of deadly force was
necessary to prevent the violence or felony.
236.

R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at

To be successful in this type of affirmative defense, the

defendant need only create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 213-215 (Utah 1985).

The State's

burden of establishing each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt remains unaffected.

JEd. at 214.

As noted previously in Point I of this brief, the
evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the jury's
verdict.

Specifically, the State introduced evidence that the

officers attempting to execute the no-knock search warrant for
defendant's residence identified themselves by yelling either
"Sheriff's Office," or "Sheriff's Department," simultaneously
with Officer Rigby's efforts to kick in defendant's front door
(T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104, 115, 121, 127, 131, 197).
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That evidence, obviously believed by the jury, established that,
although the officer's attempted entry was violent and
tumultuous, defendant could not have reasonably believed that the
purpose of the attempted entry was to do violence or commit a
felony; thus, he could not have reasonably believed that his use
of deadly force was necessary to prevent the commission of
violence or a felony.

R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at 236.

Significantly,

in his brief on appeal, defendant concedes that "[i]f he knew
they were police armed with a search warrant when they began
breaking through, the reasonable grounds would not exist" (Br. of
App. at 17). However, defendant contends that due to an alleged
disagreement among the evidence presented as
to whether and how the officers identified
themselves, the short amount of time
involved, [his] surprise, his expectations
that someone was coming to get even with him,
and also because of the considerable noise
and confusion, there is reasonable doubt as
to whether or not [he] knew they were the
police.
(Br. of App. 17).
Defendant's claim that his use of deadly force in this
instance was justified as defense of habitation is unsupported by
any evidence except his self-serving testimony that he believed
he was about to be robbed because the officers either failed to
identify themselves, or he did not hear them yell their identity
during the attempted execution of the search warrant (T. 222231).

The jury was certainly entitled to consider this

explanation and disregard defendant's justification of his
conduct, for it is within the jury's province to determine the
16

facts from any conflicting evidence.

State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d

475, 477 (Utah 1989); State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah
1985).

As noted previously, defendant's jury simply did not

find his story credible, and the attendant facts and
circumstances adequately support that conclusion.

State v. Lamm,

606 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1980) (where jury verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, the evidence relied upon by the jury need
not refute contrary allegations made by the defendant).
B.

Jury Instructions.

It is well established that "'[n]o party may assign as
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'"
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021-23 (Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R.
Crim. P. 19(c)).

Rule 19(c) requires more than a general

exception to the instructions; rather, the rule "requires that
the matter excepted to and the ground therefor be distinctly
stated."

State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 594 (Utah 1988).

Where,

as here, "no grounds are apparent from the text of the
instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is presumed
waived."

State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986).
Not only did defendant fail to state his objections to

the jury instructions below, but he affirmatively represented to
the court that he had no objections (T. 268). Moreover, on
appeal to this Court, defendant fails to acknowledge his failure
to object below, and makes no argument that this Court should
17

nonetheless consider his allegations in order to avoid manifest
injustice-

See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023-

Furthermore, the doctrine of invited error "prohibits a party
from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on
appeal."

State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)

(citing State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 792 P.2d 514, 516
(1990)).

See also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah

1989); State v. Gleason, 17 Utah 2d 150, 405 P.2d 793, 795 (Utah
1965).
The first instruction of which defendant complains is
the defense of habitation instruction6 which he requested and
which the court used (R. 120, jury instruction #25; compare R.
6

Jury instruction #25 which tracks the statutory
language of section 76-2-405 reads as follows:
A person is justified in using force against
another when he reasonably believes that the
force is necessary to prevent or terminate
the other's unlawful entry into or attack
upon his habitation; however, he is justified
in the use of force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if:
1. The entry is made or attempted in a
violent and tumultuous manner and he
reasonably believes that the entry is
attempted or made for the purpose of
assaulting or offering personal violence to
any person, dwelling or being therein and
that the force is necessary to prevent the
assault or offer of personal violence; or
2. He reasonably believes that the entry is
made or attempted for the purpose of
committing a felony therein and that such
force is necessary to prevent the commission
of the felony.
(R. 120). See supra, n.4 of this brief setting forth section 76«
2-405.
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65, defendant's requested jury instruction #3).

Defendant also

complains "the jury was never instructed on the respective burden
of proof" (Br. of App. at 20). However, contrary to his
allegations on appeal, defendant in fact requested an instruction
on his burden of proof which was accepted and given by the
court7 (R. 126, jury instruction #31; compare R. 68, defendant's
requested jury instruction #6).

Moreover, the jury was clearly

instructed as to the State's burden to prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 99, 102, jury instructions
#3 and #7).

As for defendant's complaint about the order in

which the defense of habitation instruction (jury instruction
#25) and the lawful entry instruction (jury instruction #268)
were read to the jury, defendant did not object to this order
below.

Furthermore, the court clearly instructed the jurors that

"[t]he order in which the instructions are given has no

Jury instruction #31 reads as follows:
The defendant bears no burden of proof on the
issue of self-defense or defense of
habitation. If, based upon the evidence of
the entire case, there is a reasonable doubt
as to whether or not he acted in self-defense
or in defense of his habitation, you must
acquit the defendant.
Jury instruction #26 reads as follows:
You are instructed that the attempted entry
of defendant's home by peace officers was
lawful in accordance with a lawfully issued
search warrant.
(R. 121).
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significance as to their relative importance" (R. 108, jury
instruction #13).
Where, as here, defendant submitted the instructions
used by the trial court which he claims were defective, and
affirmatively represented that he had no objections to the
instructions given, this Court should decline to review his
assignments of error.

Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023 (Court declined

to consider unobjected-to instruction where defense counsel
actively represented to the lower court that she had read the
instruction and had no objection to it); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205
(concluding that where an instruction is submitted by a party,
that same party cannot later object to it because he or she has
already waived any objection and endorsed it as legally sound).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of January, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

20

significance as to their relative importance" (R. 108, jury
instruction #13).
Where, as here, defendant submitted the instructions
used by the trial court which he claims were defective, and
affirmatively represented that he had no objections to the
instructions given, this Court should decline to review his
assignments of error.

Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023 (Court declined

to consider unobjected-to instruction where defense counsel
actively represented to the lower court that she had read the
instruction and had no objection to it); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205
(concluding that where an instruction is submitted by a party,
that same party cannot later object to it because he or she has
already waived any objection and endorsed it as legally sound).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ £ a a y of January, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Solomon J. Chacon, attorney for appellant, 124 South 400 East,
Suite 320, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

1992.

21

of January,

